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Introduction
Since 1997 pay determination in the public sector in Denmark has entered a new
and decisive phase. After 10 years of experiments with centrally fixed wage pools for
decentralised renegotiations, 1997 saw a breakthrough in terms of a pay reform,
which creates a serious possibility for using performance-related pay in the public
sector. The centrally controlled local pay has, in two bargaining rounds, been
abolished in favour of a completely new pay system, comprising a basic salary
combined with locally fixed pay additions related to job functions, qualifications and
performances. According to the strategy of the public employers the new types of
pay will function as an incentive system for streamlining, managerial efficiency and
flexibility in public agencies and service institutions. In this sense the new types of
pay are seen as the starting point of a so-called “company-based” and locally fixed
pay determination as an alternative to centrally fixed pay. It is the counties and
municipalities who are leading the way, while the central state administration has
mainly agreed limited trial schemes for about 10 % of the employees. In 1997 the
central parties to the agreement in the municipal sector agreed a permanent
transition to a new pay system for approx. 56% of the 640,000 employed in counties
and municipalities. And at the central agreements in 1999 practically all the
remaining employees joined up. The individual trade unions have entered into
separate agreements along similar lines on a reconstituted system for basic pay
scales for particular professions or occupational groups supplemented by a new
local pay.
The new settlements raise many questions. Will the agreements lead to the
establishment of a real company-based pay determination in the public sector, will
the public managers be able to use the new types of pay as a human resource
management tool and are the various occupational groups at all receptive of those
incentives, on which the new types of pay are based? The coming years will show
whether it is possible to carry out this quite radical break with earlier pay
determination in the public sector. Also, whether it involves, and if it is possible to
carry out, such a comprehensive change through a collective bargaining system
without threatening its unity at the same time. Initially, it could appear as though we
have reached the limit for how many objections the central parties to the agreement
can manage to co-ordinate and negotiate, within the central bargaining systems’
present organisation. It is uncertain whether a new balance can be created between
central agreements and co-ordination, on the one hand, and local negotiations and
human resource management on the other. In the Danish case we might talk of a
kind of ”negotiated management”, since local pay still requires collective framework
agreements and local negotiations, but the new settlements can also be seen as the
start of a new governance regime that will imply a radical break with the tradition of
collective bargaining and bring new public management at the forefront of public
pay determination.
The purpose of this article is to describe the institutional conditions that create the
possibility for this combination of change and stability, and hereby deliver a
theoretical framework, wherein the managerial implication of the actual change in the
public pay system can be grasped. The character and possible consequences of the
changes are emphasised. Firstly, the last ten years’ trial with decentralised pay
determination are put into a historical institutional perspective, and the main
principles in the actual, proposal for company based pay are described. Based on
this, the experiences so far and the managerial implications for a local pay
determination are evaluated. Finally, the possible consequences for the collective
bargaining system are discussed.
Pay determination at a crossroads
The demand for increased flexibility in public pay determination is not new. The
same applies to the adaptation of the central bargaining system as a "transition tool"
for new public management reforms. Since the start of the 1980s public pay
determination and personnel policies have been open to debate. A start was made
in 1983 with the first governmental modernisation and renewal program, which
pointed to the growth of the public sector and the lack of adaptability and
productivity, as one of the most important problems for Danish macroeconomics.
The program launched a series of new public management ideas, which were
followed by a strategic offensive from the public employers organisations; The
Ministry of Finance, The National Association of Municipalities (KL) and The
Association of Counties (ARF), who ever since have bombarded their opponents,
the trade unions for public employees, with demands for greater flexibility and less
automation in the public pay determination. The rigid pay system, and the thoroughly
regulated agreement and collective bargaining system, was identified as a barrier for
transition and innovation. Objections against the pay system were that comparability
criteria, predictability and standardisation had dominated, in preference to demands
for flexibility, efficiency and productivity (Finansministeriet, 1988).  Actually, the first
co-ordinated employer initiative was taken with the appointment of a pay
commission in 1986. The task suffered a shipwreck however, when the trade unions,
due to internal disagreement chose to withdraw. The main parties in both state and
municipalities still agreed a trial scheme with flexible wage pools to be implemented
locally. In 1989 the trade unions accepted not only a follow up, but also a further
development, which involved local wage pools, not classified by particular trade
unions. Later, local renegotiations were extended incrementally to approx. 0.7 % of
the total wage sum and the formulation of local wage policy criteria was requested
by the central parties to the agreement. Finally, in 1995, the parties agreed on a
phasing-out scheme, in favour of talks about the development of a new,
decentralised pay model (Pedersen, 1996c).
In 1997 exactly 10 years after the first trials, the decisive steps were taken in the
direction of a new pay system, based on the private sector model. The question is,
whether the parties to the agreement, after 10 years testing decentralised wage
pools, are equipped to get at the root of the problem: to reform the pay system itself.
It is still the employers who lead the way as innovators. The main source of
inspiration is still from the private labour market, or to be more exact, from "the pay
system of the 90's" in the industrial sector (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 1990). It is
time now to end the fixed pay scales and the long seniority process in the public pay
system. Instead the first steps are taken towards a sort of a company-based pay
determination, which takes as its starting point a locally formulated pay and
personnel policy. The new pay schemes should be based neither on the traditional
pay system's occupation hierarchy and comparability criteria nor on general norms
for distribution (wage policy solidarity), but on the contrary, on awards for specific job
functions, individual qualifications and performance so-called internal business
criteria.  These local pay additions should be used as a management tool. In this
way, public pay determination is at a crossroads - away from the current attempts to
create flexibility through common framework agreements followed by local
renegotiations, towards a more "tailored" and managerial model. The new types of
pay should now, in principle, be initiated from below i.e. from the individual public
executive agency or service organisation (”the company level”).
Reform by a small step method
Implementing radical restructuring of public pay determination would, in most other
countries, occur through a comprehensive law reform. In Denmark, where the public
labour market has been characterised by a durable institutional structure and a stable
bargaining process revolved around competing employer and employee approaches
to pay determination, central law reforms have become a rare phenomenon. The last
time we in Denmark carried out an actual reform of the public pay system, was the
civil service reform in 1969. The national, civil service pay system from 1919 was
simplified and adapted to the demands, at that time, for flexibility. At the same time,
however the civil servants had their bargaining rights enshrined in law, and were
thereby accorded equal status with the growing number of those employed on a
collective bargaining basis. The basis for an even more independent, public
agreement and bargaining system, based on the model of private labour market,
was thus created (Pedersen, 1993). Since then, there has not been a public wage
commission with a permanent mandate appointed by the parliament. Adjustments
and changes are solely agreed upon between the parties representing public
employers and employees in the state administration and in the counties and the
municipalities. The collective bargaining system has ever since and to a notable
degree during the new public management reform period from the beginning of the
1980 ´s displayed an incredible degree of stability and adaptability.
The autonomy of the collective bargaining system, in relation to the legislative
authority, was further enhanced from the mid-1980s. Then the parties from both the
public and the private bargaining systems, (after periods of income policy interrupted
its functioning on a number of occasions) accepted voluntarily to co-ordinate
collective bargaining on wage increases with a general, pay and expenditure control.
The parties even committed themselves to being socio-eonomically responsible in
future agreements on wage increases (LO, 1988). At the same time, a number of
new public management campaigns carried on by the employer organisations
pointed at new harmonisation problems with the efficiency and flexibility of the public
sector. In this way the bargaining system gradually came to play an even greater
role, not only concerning pay and employment conditions in the narrow sense, but
also for the public sector's renewal and streamlining, in the broader sense. This
occurs first and foremost through a further centralisation of the bargaining system.
The contractually employed joined the central bargaining committees respectively for
the state administration and for the counties and municipalities. The central
bargaining committees were reorganised and renamed; Central Organisation Joint
Committee (CFU) for civil servants and other employees in the state administration,
and Municipal Civil Servants and Contractually Employed (KTO) for civil servants and
other employees in the counties and municipalities. The two central bargaining
committees under the CFU and KTO respectively have, ever since, taken upon
themselves a major co-responsibility for the renewal of the public sector, by entering
into a number of framework agreements and by initiating a number of projects, which
are dependent on the details being filled out locally. Apart from framework
agreements on local pay, it is a matter of providing a framework for a number of
administrative and personnel policy possibilities. For example, such as retraining,
streamlining and reorganisation agreements, senior employee and redundancy
schemes, as well as an endless number of projects on quality-measurement,
reorganisation, functioning of work committees etc. The central parties to the
agreement even formed The Personnel Policy Forum, which formulates general
strategies of personnel policy and management, initiates projects, and organises
discussions (Pedersen 1998).
Thus, the introduction of new public management ideas and the implementation of
plans and programs have not occurred through central reforms adopted in
parliament on the basis of commissions’ recommendation, or through detailed
central agreements and accords. In the Danish case, the comprehensive changes
are created through a long-term and continuing process that could be called "the
small steps method", facilitated by “the dynamics of micro-decisions”. Framework
agreements, management by objectives and governmental plans and programs
have played the leading part. In the framework agreement, some overall procedural
rules are specified, which are left to the decentralised or local parties to complete.
Where previously there were centrally fixed rules that only required local
administration, the framework supervision opens the way for an extensive struggle
about interpretation, and a process of evaluation and learning between a central and
a local level. Within the framework of the bargaining system, it has usually taken
place through comprehensive analyses in internal working groups and project
groups, and a campaign struggle to set the agenda for future negotiations.
Afterwards, it is typical that a framework agreement is entered into, a project or a
pilot scheme is established. The parties evaluate the local implementation of the
agreement. In subsequent negotiation rounds the agreement is adjusted and
guidelines on the agreements' local application are circulated. So, changes do not
occur through one single reform, agreement or political decision, but on the contrary,
through a series of provisional agreements and micro-decisions taken over time in
many different units, involving several actors centrally as well as locally.
Through the development of this dynamics of change and stability, the bargaining
system has slowly been geared to play an ever-greater role in the continuing new
public management reform process. This is true not only of increased flexibility in
pay determination, but also, and to a considerable degree of the framework for local
personnel development, restructuring and streamlining of the public sector. Thus,
the Danish example until now refutes a major thesis in the international literature on
new public management; namely, that new public management doctrines per
definition will entail a decline or breakdown of the internal corporatism in the public
sector (Chubb & Moe,1990; Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Naschold, 1996). In Denmark it
is not a matter of de-corporatisation or decline of existing institutions. On the
contrary it is a matter of the development from a second generation to a third
generation integration between organised public employers and employees.
Collective agreements are combined with political explanations, campaigns and ad
hoc talks: trade union institutions are supplemented by professional secretariats and
a number of working and project groups, while simultaneously an itemised
negotiation and participation is woven into a net of stable and complementary forms
of participation (Pedersen, 1998).
On the basis of this development, it is no longer only the fixing of civil servants and
other employees’ pay and employment conditions, but also questions concerning the
entire public sectors limits, organisation, personnel and management, which are fixed
through a combination of central and local negotiations, in a complex interaction
between political, administrative and professional institutions.
The attempt being made to implement the proposal for the new pay system, are once
again pilot schemes and voluntary agreements. Changes do not occur from day to
day; they have already been on the way for a long time. In any case, the current
agreements on new types of pay are a sign of the start of something new. It may turn
out to be the first step on the way to a company based pay determination, i.e. a pay
determination that takes the operation of single public "companies" as its starting
point, instead of the overall wage and expenditure control and the overall
governmental modernisation and renewal programs, which since the start of the
1980's has set the framework for the central bargaining rounds. In this respect, it can
emerge that, what appears as an innocent small step in the short term, will imply
radical changes in the long term. Likewise, the implementation of the new pay
system prospectively will have considerable consequences - not solely for pay
determination - but for the basic organisation, steering and management model of the
public sector. In accordance with the small step method these consequences can be
both intended and unintended and this is why, structural changes and managerial
implications will often first occur with the benefit of hindsight. Before I turn to the
possible consequences and implications, I will describe the first step agreements on
the transition to a new pay system.
Agreements on new types of pay
With the agreements on the transition to a new pay system in the bargaining rounds
in 1997 and 1999, it looks as though the central bargaining parties have chosen to
take upon themselves a new challenge: to create the framework for a locally
embedded pay determination. More specifically the challenge is to replace the
current, centrally initiated and general pay schemes, with a new pay model that
creates the possibility for greater local autonomy of action and financial
independence of the individual areas of operation in public services. The proposed
model takes as its starting point a basic salary, which consists of a foreshortened pay
scale, combined with, respectively, centrally and locally determined additions for job
functions, personnel qualifications, as well as the possibility for locally agreed
performance-related pay. This model has been temporarily realised in a number of
separate agreements that entail different combinations of the basic model elements
and different combinations of grading and supplements.
Within the state sector, the trade unions for the academic staff entered in 1997 into
an independent agreement on the introduction of a new pay system, while for the
other groups agreement has been reached for a number of 3-year pilot projects. All
academics, who are employed after 1 January 1998, automatically follow the new
pay model, whereas it has been voluntary for other employees whether or not they
will transfer to the new system. The pilot scheme for other state employees opens
the possibility for individual departments and institutions, or parts of them, to enter
into agreements on participation, while the pilot projects are, expected primarily to
take as their starting point the individual public workplace and assumes that both the
local management and trade union representative in question, express a wish to take
part in a project. Afterwards, the actual preparation and formulation of bargaining
procedures and guidelines for implementation are to a large extent entrusted to the
local parties through the establishment of a local pay commission. Especially the
public employers however, has wished for a continued central pay control, partly of
the overall pay structure and partly of the overall wage increases
(Finansministeriet,1997a).
At the municipal level the parties have generally had a more ambitious strategy,
since there was already agreement at the separate negotiations in 1997 between a
number of the 61 trade union organisations for municipal employees, on a permanent
transition to new types of pay for almost half the employees. In 1999 practically all
the remaining groups followed up with entry into similar agreements. The common
basic model contains a number of general principles for the transition to the new pay
system, including principles for costing , different tailored models as well as guideline
and general criteria for payment of supplements for functions, qualifications or
performance. The agreements between the municipal employers’ organisation and
the individual trade union organisations hereafter entail a further specification by
stipulation of a particular pay model, a transition model, stipulation of the basic pay
scheme and prospective centrally agreed pay additions for job functions,
qualifications or performances for specific occupational groups. Local negotiating
procedures and time limits requires local agreement, such that it can be taken as a
starting point that negotiations can take place annually. It is expected that there will
also be annual talks on the wage policy and personnel policy in the single
municipality or county (KTO, 1997).
The overall pay control takes its starting point in the local adjustments. Apart from
this, an estimated percentage rise for the increase in pay level in the local use of
resources is centrally agreed. Questions of adjustments in relation to a possible,
increased consumption are taken up at the recurring, general agreement
negotiations. In this way, the framework agreements should ensure that an
unrestrained local pay drift for certain groups does not take place at the expense of
others. On the other hand, even after three years, it is still not certain to what degree
the transition to new types of pay will involve a stronger pay drift for chosen groups
and thus, to what degree the arrangement will lead to greater pay differentiation
between different groups and, perhaps not least, internally within the individual
profession or occupational group.  The answer very much depends on, if public
agencies and institutions are prepared for a real company based pay determination;
whether they will have the incentives to use local pay additions and whether they will
be able to exploit the new pay system as a management tool to support local
”business plans” and personnel policies.
Managerial  challenges
If we look at the experience of the last ten years of experiments with local
renegotiations of decentralised wage pools, we must note that this, clearly, was a
matter of a centrally initiated project, which had difficulty gathering support among
large groups of employees, as well as among many local managers. The general
schemes have been regarded by many as a "pool tyranny", in other words
something that had been agreed centrally, and which the local parties therefore
were more or less forced to find a "creative" use for, regardless of whether or not
they could see a local purpose with it (Ibsen et al., 1994). The many years of
experience, together with a general increase in decentralisation and the introduction
of management by objectives and framework adjustment has, however, also
entailed a learning process at the local level. Local negotiating procedures and
routines have been developed, and it has become more usual for local pay
instruments to be used purposefully, in that the local parties have begun to develop
strategies for the  use of pay additions. At the same time, several institutions have
formulated a personnel policy and, to a greater degree, have begun to substantiate
concrete implementations with explicit reasons. Again, though, there are big
differences at the local level, both in respect of the degree of decentralisation,
concrete negotiating models and the character of formulated policies and strategies
(Pedersen,1996c).
Since the public employers and the majority of the trade unions now feel prepared to
begin developing new types of pay, the springboard will therefore be whether the
preconditions for this have been created at the local level and whether the conditions
for a new governance regime, which facilitates the "company orientation", have been
developed is the area in question. The possibilities for an actual company based pay
model in the public sector cannot be regarded only as an isolated agreement
question. This has to be compared with what kind of steering and management
philosophy lies behind the 1980s and 1990s modernisation and renewal programs,
and to what degree and how, this philosophy is developed and implemented in a
given part of the public service sector, whether it be within a given ministry, a
municipality, or a more detached public institution.
The last 10-15 years' framework management, rule simplification and
decentralisation have not only changed administrative, legal and agreement
structures in the public sector. By the incremental method, the steering conditions
have also been changed in a number of crucial ways. Constitutional principles are
still in force, but today they function in an interaction with an economic steering
philosophy. An important part of the modernisation and renewal programs has been
about: developing new steering mechanisms that can reduce and control the wildly
growing welfare state and remedy bureaucratisation and the "tyranny of
regulations", as it is called. The individual executives at the local level can no longer
grasp the extensive framework of regulation and the complicated procedures, which
limit the single public organisations' possibilities for action, effectiveness and
flexibility in the solving of public tasks (Finansministeriet, 1991, 1992).
The indicated steering problems are mostly tackled through different forms of
economic steering of "input and output". "The Extended Total Balance Principle" and
a general principle of financial framework control was launched at a central budget
reform in 1984 as a radical means of achieving a determined steering through
controlling  "input" i.e. the financial supply of resources instead of steering by detailed
rules. This "bag-of-money principle" has since generally been in effect in both the
state administration and in the counties and municipalities. A number of central
barriers are removed through rule simplification and framework steering and are at
the same time handed over to the executive level to dispose of within a fixed
economic framework. From the 1990s on, supplementary resource steering was tried
with different kinds of control of "output", for example by measurements of
productivity and performance, service declarations and quality evaluation. Through
the dissemination of contract management by contracting out to private contractors,
but also inside government and municipal organisations as well, administrative policy
experts, especially in the Ministry of Finance, wish to gradually to open up the walls"
of the administrative hierarchy and thereby create the possibility of "reciprocal
relations" between politicians and top managers on the one hand and the individual
executives and line managers on the other. Where rule management, clearly was a
question of instruction and over-subordination relationships, the new contract
management should be based on mutual adjustments according to operational
accountability criteria (Finansministeriet, 1996).
The limits for public management should, to a greater degree, be fixed through the
development of new management mechanisms in the relationship between the
corporate level (top management in the ministry, county or municipality), the
department level (sector administration or task areas) and finally the operational
level (the single executive organisation). According to the "input-output model" (see
figure below), it should take place through firstly, the development of tailor-made
financial control systems and local accounting principles, which gives the individual
governmental or municipal organisation the incentive to act in a financially rational
way and operate effectively (for example, generate a profit from the implemented
rationalisations and invested human capital). Secondly, it should occur through a
more precise response from the operational level to the results attained and their
quality (for example through certification, service declarations, performance
measurement, price competition, marketing testing etc.) (Finansministeriet, 1996).
The Black Box Model
This "input - output model" entails a completely different understanding of steering,
than the one we previously have known from the public sector. The execution of
public tasks is seen as a production of services, which make it possible to turn the
"production process" itself, and the particular production preconditions into a "black
box". The politicians shall no longer be interested in detailed procedural demands,
but only in input and output. Creating coherence between objectives, financial
resources, quality and performance (the difficult triangle) is left to the "producing"
units at the operational level. That also means that strategic competence is partially
delegated to the individual public organisation. It is out here that business plans have
to be made, organisational development and human resource management
strategies have to be conceived, and wage policy criteria have to be formulated.
Despite the development of new financial control and accounting systems, operating
agreements and attempts at contract management, this ideal model is, though, by no
means fully implemented in the public sector. The continued decentralisation to the
individual public organisation and the development of new management relationships
between a political, an administrative and an operational level is still an open
laboratory. Administration experts, both in the Ministry of Finance and in the
municipal organisations, are continuing to strive to develop new management
instruments. At the same time, new organisational and company models are being
developed within specific areas of operation, such as customs and tax administration,
post services, the railways, public schools, care for the elderly and day-care
institutions, to name but a few. So far, we have seen many temporary local solutions
to the input-output problem that implies different degrees of operational autonomy
and different alternative control and evaluating mechanisms too. The preconditions
for implementing the new pay system, therefore becomes a much more local
question of concrete steering model, organisational structure, strategic capability and
management competence.
However, the profound and more radical decentralisation i.e. company- and even
market-orientation of public agencies and organisations indicates a break with the
"centralised-decentralisation" of NPM reforms of the 1980´s towards a more poly-
centric institutional order, which again implies the introduction of a new governance
regime (Pedersen, 2000).
Theoretical, it is a paradox in that autonomy1 becomes a precondition for steering.
Where the central regulation control and rule management depended on "remote
control", (i.e. that all local practice was based on clearly detailed rules, fixed by
legislation or central agreement), a locally embedded steering depends on "self
steering", (i.e. that the executive element is itself able to formulate objectives, lay
strategies and take responsibility for their attainment).2  The new pay model implies
that the local and executive level should be capable of not only filling out the contents
of the overall framework and principles with concrete criteria. It should also be able to
formulate and explain plans and strategies in connection with a given area of public
service or a single public organisation. It is no longer enough to administrate
according to formal rules and let others direct you. Now, one's own self-assured
profile and objectives should be formulated on the basis of local procedures and
forms of interaction. The individual public organisation or “company” should, to a
much greater degree, be able to manage itself. It is no longer perceived as the
outermost element of an administrative hierarchy, but on the contrary, as a still more
independent strategic unit, a public organisation or company under separate
management (Pedersen, 1998).
In fact, the poly-centric state requires that managerial preconditions for the desired
company-orientation can be created. In that perspective, we are still faced with a
number of dilemmas:
The first dilemma concerns the relationship between the individual organisations’
operational effectiveness and the overall budget adjustment policy: how, and to what
degree, incentives are created for the individual public company to invest in the
personnel’s qualifications and performances. It is still relevant to ask; where are the
                                                
1  Autonomy comes from autos-nomos; "to give one self the law". Thus,  autonomy does not refer to formal
competence
or authority , but to the capability and resourcefulness to take competence and responsibility on one self.
2 This way of adressing the concept of management is inspired by newer contributions in legal sociology and
neo-functionalism in terms of reflexive legislation, supervision state and indirect political management as
incentives and where is the "bottom line", that the return on investments is to be
measured by? Can public companies see a financial advantage investing in
development and streamlining, or is the money channelled back into the "mahogany
box", i.e. clawed-back via appropriation or budgetary regulations? It is still unclear,
what operational calculations can be permitted in a completely, or partially, publicly
financed service sector, that in principle should be run politically by governmental
institutions.
The second dilemma concerns the relationship between operational effectiveness,
the rule of law and professional standards and considerations. There is an important
discussion on whether the quality of public service provision can be ensured solely
through a quantitative or standardised measurement of quality and performances
and, whether we are prepared to relax the general principle of rule by law as well as
professional standards to ensure the effective operation of the public companies
based on accountability criteria. When one attempts to implement an incentive
system, based solely on the precondition of a rational code of behaviour and an
appraisal of quality and performance, based solely on quantitative measurement
criteria, there unavoidably arises a conflict, partly with the legal regulation of public
service provision and administration tasks, partly with an extensive technical and
professional knowledge, associated with different sectors and profession groups.
Clear limits and balancing mechanisms have not as yet been established between
the legal administrative, the professional and the operational management of public
organisations.
The third dilemma concerns the relationship between management and negotiating
principles. It is still uncertain, whether the ongoing radical and comprehensive
decentralisation of pay determination, combined with the development of local
personnel policies and human resource management strategies, will impose the
principles of collective bargaining. The introduction of still more independent local
negotiations indirectly implies a weakening of the agreement institution, because
there are no legal rights of conflict, though both strikes and lock-outs are not allowed
in relation to local negotiations. Furthermore, the employers’ organisations have
asked for and even taken a trial in High Court on a deviation from the collective
agreements’ rights for top-managers and other groups. In a broader sense this could
be seen as a development toward a still more profound individualisation of jobs,
working conditions and pay determination, which conform the efforts to improve the
qualities of leadership and management skills in public organisations. This
consequently questions the limits of and the individual balance between the
management right and the right of making collective agreements, today almost 100
years after the first negotiation rights were established on the public labour market.
                                                                                                                                                        
examples of handling steering problems in autopoetic social systems. For an introduction see: Teubner, 1992;
Willke 1992; Sand, 1996, Andersen, Born & Majgaard 1995.
Pari passu with the establishment of a new functional domain for public management
at an operational level of single public organisations or companies the system of
collective bargaining is challenged by the adoption to new demands for flexibility, and
as a novelty, possibly also a more modest and withdrawn role in pay determination
and in NPM reform processes as well.
The future of the collective bargaining system
Public pay determination is at a crossroad. After many years of central co-ordination
of pay determination with ever more income, expenditure and administrative policy
considerations, the bargaining system is now in the process of creating the
framework for a company-based pay determination in the public sector. Thus, the
bargaining system is moving from a strong centralisation to a greater degree of
decentralisation, from common and transverse agreements towards several different
kinds of separate agreements and finally, from a decentralised co-ordination towards
an actual company orientation. There is no doubt that this development, in the longer
term, will change the role of the bargaining system.
lt is clear that such a development will entail many partial conflicts, since the parties
to central agreement have to cede sovereignty to a new, and ever more independent,
company level. However, nothing indicates that we are faced with the bargaining
system's imminent collapse. Firstly, it is through the established bargaining system,
that it is now being attempted to set common limits for separate agreements about
company-based types of pay. Secondly, both parties to the agreement have
expressed a wish to continue central steering and co-ordination, which apart from the
fixing of the general wage increases, will involve a number of regulation and
harmonisation schemes and qualitative elements. Thirdly, the bargaining system has,
during the last ten years, gradually expanded its own area of competence, by being
involved to a much greater degree in setting the limits for the decentralised
restructuring and renewal policy, for social, educational and employment conditions
and finally for the implementation of EU directives (Pedersen, 1998).
The pressures of restructuring and reprioritising in the central bargaining system
have, however, gone into a new and crucial phase. Carrying out and further
developing the new types of pay imply that the central agreements on basic pay
schemes and general wage increase will be combined with locally fixed pay based on
operational parameters. The main points of contention will be; how the parties will
manage a so-called "wage drift" in the public sector and how, afterwards, to regulate
in relation to those groups, who have not had a local wage drift. The employers are
being pressured to give up the overall wage control a cornerstone in budget reforms
in favour of a local streamlining of individual operational areas and organisations.
They will demand fewer ties in the central agreements, in order to get a more local
and flexible pay determination, while the employees’ organisations will attempt to
maintain the central management by regulations. The risk is that the many separate
and "tailor-made” agreements and the decentralised construction of different pay
models will create a renewed bureaucratisation, and thereby eliminate the extensive
rule simplification of the bargaining system, which was made possible by the
centralisation of the 1980's.
The employees and their organisations are under pressure to relax the solidarity in
the central bargaining committees in favour of a so-called "spearhead strategy", that
will lift some groups locally, but not all. To make pay determination dependent on
streamlining the operation can certainly prove expensive over time. The employees
will accept in return a softening of professional boundaries, increased working tempo
and internal pay differentiation within different professions or occupational groups. In
return, the reward, could be that there will be a better connection between local wage
and personnel policies to the benefit of qualification and job development at the
individual workplace, which becomes an ever more important negotiating arena for
the employees’ representatives and their organisations.
Generally the development is an expression that the traditional profession and trade
orientation, which has created the basis for the whole of the existing collective
bargaining system, and the common, labour orientation, which until now has been
the basis for unity in the central bargaining committees, is being challenged by an
ever stronger workplace orientation or even individualisation. The concrete wage and
personnel policies are determined, to a greater degree, in the individual workplace
and it therefore becomes a major challenge to equip both local managers and staff
representatives to take upon themselves the responsibility for wage and personnel
policies. Likewise, it will also be a challenge to create new forms of co-ordination
between the top and the bottom in the trade union organisations and between top
managers and line managers.
A fully developed pay reform, however, will not be established with the first
generation of new pay agreements. So far, we have taken the first crucial step, but if
we are to learn from experiences, a real company-based pay determination in the
public sector will take at least 10 years to be fully implemented.  Company orientation
does not come by itself. The preconditions are only beginning to be installed. In the
meantime the central and local parties on both sides of the negotiation table have a
great opportunity to experiment and make their influence felt. Many so-called tailor-
made models can be imagined and many real Danish compromises will certainly
pave the way.
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